Resumo A teoria democrática apresenta inúmeras perspectivas sobre o que assegura a autoridade das decisões coletivas. Parte da literatura sustenta que o valor a justificar a reivindicação de legitimidade seria a autonomia moral, que não pode ser violada por critérios substantivos sujeitos ao desacordo razoável - isto é, uma norma seria legítima se os cidadãos (ou seus representantes) forem os responsáveis pela decisão final. De outro lado, sugere-se que o resultado dos procedimentos democráticos deve ser julgado à luz de parâmetros substantivos de justiça - ou seja, a moralidade da democracia se sustenta sobre uma avaliação dos resultados a partir de critérios substantivos independentes. O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar uma saída para o dilema: a partir da perspectiva deliberativa, será apresentado o argumento que afirma a mútua pressuposição entre o valor da democracia e os direitos fundamentais. Tendo em vista a inexorabilidade de um conflito entre os requisitos procedimentais e substantivos para a legitimidade política, sustento que o diálogo interinstitucional e, não, a última palavra, seria uma resposta normativamente mais adequada para o problema da autoridade legítima. Argumento no texto que a abordagem dos sistemas deliberativos incorpora a tensão entre procedimento e substância e apresenta uma compreensão bem fundamentada sobre a dinâmica política que envolve a formulação de normas capazes de reivindicar justificabilidade perante uma sociedade democrática.

Abstract Democratic theory presents numerous perspectives on what ensures the authority of collective decisions. Part of the literature argues that the value to justify the legitimacy claim would be moral autonomy, which cannot be violated by substantive criteria subject to reasonable disagreement - that is, a norm would be legitimate if citizens (or their representatives) are the ones responsible for the final decision. On the other hand, studies suggest that the result of democratic procedures should be judged in light of substantive parameters of justice - that is, the morality of democracy lies on an evaluation of outcomes from independent substantive criteria. Hence, this paper presents a way out of this dilemma: from a deliberative perspective, it affirms the mutual presupposition between the value of democracy and fundamental rights. Given the inexorability of a conflict between procedural and substantive requirements for political legitimacy, the article argues that interinstitutional dialogue, rather than the last word, would be a more normatively adequate response to the issue of legitimate authority. The deliberative systems approach incorporates the tension between procedure and substance and presents a well-grounded understanding of the political dynamics surrounding the formulation of norms capable of claiming justification in a democratic society.

This study addresses, from a theoretically oriented perspective, the relationship between freedom of expression and democracy, trying to assess its implications for the regulation of mass media. Starting with a legal case in which a TV channel and a journalist were prosecuted for hate speech, looking at the reaction of the São Paulo Press Association to the case, I examine three perspectives on the statute and the reach of expressive liberties—the Millian Principle, the collectivist approach, and the participatory view—which connect these liberties to the ideas of moral autonomy and self-determination. For different, but related, reasons, these views present a conception of free speech that would not garner universal agreement in a pluralistic society. Moreover, some of the ideas defended could justify rules (or the absence of them) that might harm the social bases of self-respect. In opposition to these lines of thought, I argue for the fair value of communicative liberties; i.e., the idea that everyone should have access to the same rights and effective conditions to exercise communication. This means a fair distribution of opportunities for occupying the mediated public space and the establishment of rules to discourage the dissemination of ideas that fail to acknowledge the equal respect that we owe to each other as members of the political association. Democracy, I shall contend, comprises both private and public autonomy. A fair system of communicative freedom is to be seen as the outcome of and the upholding force in a democratic society.